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Abstract
This paper compares stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade
liberalization. In the FTA game, each country can form an FTA with
either one of its trade partners, or both of them, or none of them. By
contrast, in the No FTA game, each country must choose either no
agreement or free trade. Under symmetry, free trade is uniquely stable
under the No FTA game whereas the FTA game also admits a bilateral
FTA as an equilibrium. However, there exist patterns of cost asym-
metry for which the freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs is necessary for
achieving global free trade.
Keywords: Multilateral Trade Liberalization, Free Trade Agree-
ments, GATT, Intraindustry Trade, Oilgopoly. JEL Classications:
F13, F12.
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1 Introduction
By their very nature, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) require mem-
ber countries to grant tari¤ reductions to each other that are typically not
extended to non-members. Ever since Jacob Viners (1950) classic analy-
sis, the static distortions created by such preferential trade liberalization
have received signicant attention from economists and policy-makers alike.
Furthermore, in recent years there has been widespread concern regarding
the potential adverse e¤ects of PTAs on the process of multilateral trade
liberalization the raison detre of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
This concern appears to be rather well-founded: so widespread are PTAs
today that Mongolia is the only country in the world that does not belong
to one. As per the WTOs web-site, over 200 PTAs are o¢ cially in force
today and their number is expected to reach 400 by 2010. Furthermore,
such arrangements have spread rather rapidly in the last decade or so: since
1996, as many as 150 new PTAs have come into existence. Under the in-
tricate and ever-increasing web of PTAs, the notion of most favored nation
(MFN) treatment has begun to appear more of an exception rather than a
core rule of the WTO.
The two most commonly occurring PTAs are free trade agreements
(FTAs) and customs unions, with over 80% them being FTAs (Crawford
and Fiorentino, 2005). Accordingly, this paper focuses on FTAs and asks:
how does the pursuit of FTAs interact with the process of multilateral trade
liberalization? Would global free trade be easier to achieve if countries were
to pursue trade liberalization only multilaterally? Or as Jagdish Bhagwati
(1991) put it are FTAs building or stumbling blocs for multilateral trade
liberalization? While the meaning of the phrase stumbling bloc is rela-
tively clear, what does the phrase building blocprecisely mean? Does it
mean that the process of bilateral trade liberalization eventually converges
to multilateral free trade (as in Furusawa and Konishi (2007) and Goyal
and Joshi (2006))? Or does it mean that FTAs lay the foundation for mul-
tilateral trade liberalization in the sense that the freedom to pursue FTAs
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is necessary to attain global free trade? Existing literature has often tended
to take the view that FTAs are building blocs so long as their pursuit does
not prevent or eventually leads to the obtainment of global free trade. We
take this argument one step further and show that there exist circumstances
where global free trade is an equilibrium only if countries are free to form
bilateral FTAs. When such is the case, we say that FTAs act as strong build-
ing blocs. To our knowledge, with the exception of Aghion et. al. (2007),
this potential role of FTAs has been overlooked by the voluminous existing
literature on the subject. The reason for this is easy to see as we explain
below, only a model in which both bilateral and multilateral negotiations
are endogenous can lead to such an insight.
The general idea behind our strong building bloc result can be stated as
follows. If bilateral FTAs are prohibited by multilateral rules (or infeasible
due to some other reasons) and the choice is only between multilateral free
trade or no agreement (i.e. the status quo), any single country can ensure
that the status quo prevails by simply opting to not practise free trade itself.
However, when the rest of the world is free to form bilateral FTAs, a country
that makes such a choice can nd itself immiserized relative to the status quo
if the other countries choose to undertake preferential trade liberalization
amongst themselves.1 Anticipating this outcome, it may then become quite
willing to undertake multilateral trade liberalization. Thus, the possibility
of preferential trade liberalization amongst others can induce a country to
participate in multilateral trade liberalization. While we demonstrate the
strong building bloc result in the oligopoly model of intraindustry trade
(described in greater detail below), it is clear that the mechanism underlying
it is not model specic and is likely to arise in most existing models of
international trade.
Formally, we analyze the coalition proof Nash equilibria (also called sta-
ble equilibria) of two games of trade liberalization between three countries.2
1See Chang and Winters (2002) for detailed evidence showing that the formation of the
Latin American customs union MERCOSUR adversely a¤ected non-member countries by
lowering the prices of their exports to MERCOSUR.
2Our terminology follows Dutta and Mutuswami (1997).
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Under the FTA game, countries can pursue either bilateral, multilateral, or
no trade liberalization whereas under the No FTA game, they have only
the latter two options. It is worth noting that under the FTA game each
country is free to pursue multiple FTAs this is important because, on av-
erage, each country today belongs to six PTAs (World Bank, 2005). Our
underlying framework is one of intraindustry trade under oligopoly where
the production cost of the oligopolistic good can di¤er across countries (see
Brander and Krugman, 1983). The FTA game proceeds as follows. In the
rst stage, each country announces the set of countries with whom it wants
to form a bilateral FTA (under which member countries abolish tari¤s on
each other). An FTA between two countries arises i¤ they both announce
each others name. Similarly, free trade emerges i¤ all countries call each
others names. Next, rms compete in the product market in a Cournot
fashion. In contrast to the FTA game, in the rst stage of the No FTA
game, each country can choose between only two alternatives: it can either
announce in favor of free trade or no agreement (wherein they retain their
existing tari¤s on each other). The rest of the No FTA game proceeds just
like the FTA game.
Since markets are assumed to be segmented, from each countrys perspec-
tive, an FTA embodies the following trade-o¤. On the one hand, forming a
bilateral FTA lowers a countrys domestic surplus relative to no agreement
because of the tari¤ concession it grants to the other member. On the other
hand, the reciprocal tari¤ reduction granted by the other member increases
its export prots. Utilizing this trade-o¤, we obtain several interesting re-
sults. First, we show that under symmetry, free trade is a stable equilibrium
of both games. However, while free trade is the unique stable agreement of
the No FTA game, a bilateral FTA can also be a stable equilibrium of the
FTA game (weak stumbling bloc e¤ect). Second, there exists patterns of
cost asymmetry for which multilateral free trade is an equilibrium only if
countries have the option to form FTAs (strong building bloc e¤ect). Third,
despite the absence of any political economy considerations in our model,
free trade can fail to be an equilibrium even when FTAs are not permissi-
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ble if one of the countries is su¢ ciently high cost relative to others. Under
such a scenario, FTAs can act as partial building blocs by providing welfare
improving bilateral trade liberalization. Fourth, a huband spoke type
arrangement a regime where one country has a bilateral FTA with both
its trading partners who in turn do not have an FTA with each other fails
to be a stable equilibrium under symmetry. In other words, some degree of
cost asymmetry is essential for such a regime to emerge as a stable equilib-
rium. Finally, it is worth noting that FTAs never act as strong stumbling
blocs in our model i.e. it is never the case that the FTA game yields no
agreement whereas the No FTA games yields free trade.
Given the importance of the topic, it is no surprise that there exists a
voluminous literature on PTAs. In what follows, we only discuss papers
that are closely related to ours and refer the reader to Bhagwati et. al.
(1999) for a collection of many of the important contributions in the area.
Our paper shares some key elements with Furusawa and Konishi (2007),
Goyal and Joshi (2006), Aghion et. al. (2007), and Krishna (1998). Both
Furusawa and Konishi (2007) and Goyal and Joshi (2006) apply the network
formation game of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) to examine whether or
not a given trade conguration is pairwise stable.3 Under symmetry, they
nd that the continued formation of bilateral FTAs leads to global free
trade. However, while they examine whether or not bilateralism results
in global free trade, they do not consider the consequences of adopting a
strictly multilateral approach to global trade negotiations, a comparison
that is central to our paper. As a result, they do not address the issue
of when and why countries choose to pursue bilateral trade liberalization
when multilateral trade liberalization is an option, an issue that lies at the
heart of the complex relationship between the two types of liberalization.
Using a three-country version of the Brander-Krugman model (also utilized
3Relative to our approach, the concept of pairwise stability implies two constraints.
First, the deviating coalition can contain at most two countries. Second, a deviation
can consist of severing just one existing link or forming one additional link. In order to
eliminate these constraints, we follow Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) and use the concept
of coalition proof Nash equilibrium to isolate stable equilibria.
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by us), Krishna (1998) has shown that the formation of an FTA between
two countries reduces their incentives to liberalize trade with respect to the
third country. However, in a model with endogenous tari¤s, Ornelas (2005a)
shows that an FTA induces member countries to lower their tari¤s on the
non-member country (which in turn reduces its incentive to participate in
multilateral trade liberalization). Unlike us, Krishna (1998) and Ornelas
(2005a) do not develop an equilibrium theory of FTAs and instead consider
the e¤ects of an exogenously given FTA.4
Our conceptual approach is related to that of Aghion et. al. (2007)
who examine a leading countrys choice between sequential and multilat-
eral bargaining of free trade agreements. Like us, Aghion et. al. (2007)
also identify building and stumbling bloc e¤ects of FTAs. However, there
are important di¤erences between their approach and ours. First, in our
model, all countries are free to negotiate FTAs and not just a single lead-
ing country.5 Also, countries are free to form a pair of bilateral FTAs in
our model and are not required to choose between joining a single grand
coalition or staying out. Second, our analysis complements theirs in two
important respects (i) we assume that governments care aggregate social
welfare whereas their examples illustrating the e¤ects of FTAs assume gov-
ernments care only about producer surplus and (ii) unlike them but like
Grossman and Helpman (1995), we do not allow transfers between di¤erent
coalitions.6 Point (ii) is important because when transfers are possible and
4Ornelas (2005b) provides an analysis of political economy considerations that arise in
the context of FTAs.
5Aghion et. al. (2007) do consider extensions where the leadership role is assigned to
other countries if the rst leaders o¤er is not accepted by the followers but they focus on
deriving necessary conditions for a free trade equilibrium.
6Grossman and Helpman (1995) point out that transfers are rarely used in trade agree-
ments and when used they are limited in scope. However, Aghion et. al. (2007) note
that the exchange of concessions on non-trade-related issues among FTA members can
be viewed as transfers. Both arguments capture certain aspects of reality. Since one
of our goals is to provide a non-cooperative theory of FTA formation in a game with
non-transferable utility, we proceed with the assumption of no transfers. In this con-
text, it is noteworthy that Raimondos-Møller and Woodland (2006) have shown that if
non-discriminatory tari¤ reforms by a subset of countries are accompanied by appropriate
income transfers between them, reforming members can make themselves strictly better
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there is grand coalition superadditivity, in the absence of externalities free
trade necessarily emerges in equilibrium regardless of whether the leading
country chooses a sequential or multilateral approach.7 In our model, even
when free trade is Pareto optimal (as it is under symmetry), a bilateral FTA
can emerge in equilibrium.
Our model is also related to that of Riezman (1999) who asks whether the
option to pursue FTAs facilitates or hinders the achievement of free trade.
However, while we analytically derive the coalition proof Nash equilibria
of two non-cooperative games, Riezman (1999) uses the cooperative solu-
tion concept of the core and illustrates his results via numerical examples.
Second, our model allows us to focus on asymmetries between countries in
a way that cannot be done in the inter-industry trade framework utilized
by Riezman (1999). As has already been noted, cost asymmetry between
countries plays a crucial role in determining conditions under FTAs act as
partial and strong building blocs. In this context, it is worth noting that
both Krugman (1991) and Grossman and Helpman (1995) pointed out that
asymmetries across countries could play an important role in determining
the relationship between bilateral and multilateral trade liberalization.
The e¤ects of free trade agreements have also been analyzed in models of
repeated interaction between countries that require multilateral cooperation
to be self-enforcing  see Bagwell and Staiger (1997), Bond and Syropou-
los (1996), Conconi and Perroni (2003), Freund (2000), and Saggi (2006).
We add value to this literature by treating both bilateral and multilateral
liberalization as endogenous. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) provide a
completely di¤erent perspective on international trade agreements by show-
ing that, in the presence of domestic protectionist pressures, such agreements
o¤ without having an adverse e¤ect on non-members.
7Grand coalition superadditivity holds if the joint payo¤ of the three countries is
larger under free trade than under no FTAs whatsoever or a bilateral FTA between any
two countries. When this condition fails, Aghion et. al. (2007) show that the nature of
externalities created by FTAs assumes a crucial role: when such externalities are negative,
FTAs necessarily facilitate the achievement of global free trade whereas when they are
positive, they hamper it. In our model, a bilateral FTA necessarily generates a negative
externality for the non-member.
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can improve the domestic allocation of resources by helping a government
credibly commit to free trade.8
2 Model
There are three countries (a; b; c) and two goods: x and y. Preferences over
the two goods are quasilinear: U(x; y) = u(x) + y. Good x is produced
by a single prot-maximizing rm in each country at a constant marginal
cost in terms of the numeraire good y.9 Firms compete in quantities and
make independent decisions regarding how much to sell in each market (i.e.
markets are segmented as in Brander and Krugman, 1983).
2.1 Production and trade
Due to market segmentation, it is su¢ cient to focus on only one countrys
market. Let t denote a countrys tari¤ on a trading partner with whom
it does not have an FTA. In other words, under no agreement (i.e. the
status quo) each country imposes the tari¤ t on both its trading partners
whereas if it has an FTA with both of them it practises free trade. As Gross-
man and Helpman (1995) note, GATT Article XXIV forbids FTA members
from raising their tari¤s on non-members. Accordingly, like Duttagupta
and Panagariya (2006) we assume that FTA members retain their status
quo tari¤ t on the non-member.
We now describe production and trade under no agreement. Firm js
e¤ective marginal cost of exporting equals j + t where j  0 equals its
marginal cost of production for good x. By assumption, countries impose
no taxes on local rms and the numeraire good that may be traded inter-
nationally in order to balance trade.
8 In a recent paper, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) build a model of trade agree-
ments that integrates the terms of trade motive for FTAs emphasized by Bagwell and
Staiger (1997) with the commitment argument analyzed in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare
(1998).
9The monopoly assumption is not necessary. We just need rms to have market power
in order to justify the existence of tari¤s in a welfare-maximizing framework.
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Let xji denote country js exports to country i; xii the sales of rm i in
country i; and xi = xii +
X
j
xji denote total sales of good x in country i.
Country js prot function for exports to country i, denoted by ji, can be
written as:
ji = [pi(xi)  j   t]xji (1)
First order conditions (FOCs) for prot maximization for exporters are
pi + p
0
ixji = j + t (2)
The above FOCs together with an analogous condition for the local rm
(i.e. pi + p0ixii = i) determine the equilibrium output levels of all rms.
Summing the FOCs for all rms in country i gives
3pi + p
0
ixi = 2t+
X
z
z where z = a; b; c: (3)
Following Bergstrom and Varian (1985), if the left hand side is decreasing in
xi (i.e. 4p0i+ p
00
i xi < 0) then total industry output sold in country i depends
only on the sum of the (tari¤ included) marginal costs of production of all
rms. Assume this property holds so that we have:
dxi
dt
< 0 (4)
In addition, the following comparative statics are also assumed to hold:10
dxji
dt
< 0 <
dxii
dt
(5)
In other words, an increase in the tari¤ rate (t) lowers country js exports
to county i (xji) while it increases the sales of its local rm (xii).
Welfare of country i is dened as the sum of its domestic surplus and
total export prots:
Wi  Si +
X
j 6=i
ij (6)
10As is well known, if second order conditions for prot maximization hold these com-
parative statics obtain when the Cournot Nash equilibrium is stable and output levels
of rms are strategic substitutes. Since these results are well known, it is convenient to
directly assume that the comparative statics in (5) hold.
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where domestic surplus Si is dened as
Si  u(xi)  pixi +ii + t
X
j
xji (7)
where u(xi) pixi is consumer surplus in country i; ii = (pi  i)xii equals
rm is prots in its own market; t
X
j
xji equals country is tari¤ revenue;
and ij = (pi  i  t)xij its prots in foreign market j; where j 6= i. World
welfare is dened the sum of the welfare of individual countries:
WW =Wi +Wj +Wk (8)
Since the formation of FTAs results in the elimination of some of the
tari¤s, in what follows in functions S(:) and W (:) we list the tari¤s faced by
foreign countries in ascending alphabetical order. Also, in the export prot
function ij(:), the rst argument is the tari¤ faced by country i while the
second argument is the tari¤ faced by its rival exporter (i.e. country k).
As is well known from the work of Brander and Spencer (1984), under
fairly general conditions each country has a unilateral incentive to impose
rent extracting tari¤s on its trading partners (unless it commits not to do
so via an FTA). Accordingly, we assume that the following holds:
Assumption 1:
Si(t; t) > maxfSi(0; t); Si(t; 0)g > Si(0; 0)
i.e. domestic surplus of each country is highest under no agreement and
lowest when it practises free trade. Since countries are asymmetric, a com-
parison of Si(0; t) and Si(t; 0) is ambiguous in general.
Let T be the set of all feasible trade policy regimes:
T = fhfgi; hfabgi; hfacgi; hfbcgi; hfab; acgi; hfab; bcgi; hfac; bcgi, or hfFgig
where hfgi denotes the status quo and and hfFgi denotes global free trade.
Let r and v be any two elements of T . Further, let wi(r) denote country
is welfare and ww(r) denote world welfare under regime r. Note that small
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letters denote functions of trade regimes whereas capital letters denote func-
tions of tari¤s that prevail during those regimes. For example, country is
welfare under the FTA hfijgi can be written either as wi(ij) or as Wi(0; t).
Similar notation applies to domestic surplus and export prot functions.
Dene wi(r   v) as the di¤erence between country is welfare under
regimes r and v:
wi(r   v)  wi(r)  wi(v) (9)
As is well known, under Cournot competition, the higher a countrys cost
of producing good x, the smaller its volume of exports and the larger its
volume of imports (of this good). Given this and Grossman and Helpmans
(1995) argument that an FTA is more likely to obtain when trade between
potential partners is relatively balanced, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2:
@wi(r   v)
@i
 0  @wi(r   v)
@m
where m is an FTA partner of country i under regime r (but not regime v).
To get further insight behind assumption 2, consider regimes hfgi and
hfijgi from country is perspective. The intuition underlying @wi(ij )@i  0
is as follows. Because of their larger volume of imports, higher cost countries
have relatively more to gain from using tari¤s. Similarly, due to the smaller
volume of their exports, higher cost countries have less to lose from other
countriestari¤s. As a result, a countrys willingness to enter into a bilateral
FTA with another depends negatively on its own cost.
A similar intuition underlies @wi(ij )@j  0. The higher the production
cost of its trading partner, the larger the increase in export prots enjoyed
by a country due to the trade liberalization undertaken by its partner and
the smaller the loss in local prots su¤ered by the domestic rm due to its
own trade liberalization.
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3 Endogenous Free Trade Agreements
Consider the following two stage game of bilateral trade liberalization (called
the FTA game). In the rst stage, each country announces whether or
not it wants to form an FTA with each of its trading partners (country
is announcement is denoted by i). Next, given tari¤s, rms compete in
product markets. As is clear from the structure of the FTA game, an FTA
member can sign an independent FTA with the non-member without needing
consent of the other member.
A countrys strategy set consists of four possible announcements. Coun-
try is strategy set 
Fi is:

Fi = ff; g; fj; g; f; kg; fj; kgg (10)
where f; g is an announcement in favor of no agreement with either of
its trade partners. In order to conserve notation, each trade policy regime
is denoted as follows: (i) No agreement hfgi is maintained when no two
announcements match or when everyone announces f; g; (ii) an FTA
between countries i and j denoted by hfijgi is formed i¤ they both an-
nounce each others name ji and ij ; (iii) two independent bilateral
FTAs hfij; ikgi in which i is the common member are formed i¤ (1) ji
and ij and (2) ki and ik; and (iv) free trade hfFgi obtains i¤ all
countries announce each othersnames: i.e. a = fb; cg, b = fa; cg, and
c = fa; bg.
It is worth noting here that the regime under which there exist two
independent bilateral FTAs (i.e. hfij; ikgi) can be viewed as a hub and
spoketrading arrangement where the common member (i.e. country i) is
the hub while each of the other two countries (i.e. countries j and k) is
a spoke. Also note that two di¤erent strategy vectors may yield the same
agreement(s) when countriesannouncements do not match. For example,
consider the following announcements:
a = fb; g; b = fa; cg; c = f; bg (11)
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The above strategy vector gives rise to two independent FTAs hfab; bcgi of
which country b is the common member. But the same outcome obtains
when the strategy vector is given by:
a = fb; cg; b = fa; cg; c = f; bg (12)
Here, even though country a announces country c, country c wants to form
an FTA only with country b.11 In order to eliminate redundant announce-
ments, assume that each FTA announcement costs " (where " > 0 is arbi-
trarily small).
Our method of analysis is to compare the FTA game with the following
game of multilateral trade liberalization (called the No FTA game). In the
rst stage of the No FTA game, each country announces either in favor of
or against free trade. If all countries announce in favor, free trade emerges.
If not, the status quo prevails. Next, rms compete in the product market.
Clearly, the No FTA game restricts the strategy set of country i to 
i =
ff; g; fj; kgg, j 6= k 6= i. We compare the equilibria of these two games of
trade liberalization to determine how the freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs
a¤ects the likelihood of obtaining global free trade.
As might be expected, both games admit multiple Nash equilibria. To
deal with this multiplicity and to capture the process of FTA formation
in a more realistic fashion, we focus attention on Nash equilibria that are
immune to self-enforcing coalitional deviations (i.e. are coalition proof or
stable).12 It is useful to note that in the No FTA game, a unilateral devia-
tion from free trade by any country reverts everyone back to no agreement
whereas in the FTA game the same deviation results in the deviating coun-
try becoming either (i) a non-member country under an FTA between the
other two countries or (ii) a spoke under a pair of bilateral FTAs. Since the
welfare of a country under these trade policy regimes can be lower/higher
11Note that under our approach, the formation of a bilateral FTA requires consent from
both sides. This is in contrast to the open membership rule analyzed by Yi (1996) where
existing members cannot prevent others from joining.
12See Bernheim et. al. (1987) for the formal denition of a coalition proof Nash equi-
librium.
13
than its welfare under no agreement, it is not immediately obvious under
which game the unilateral incentive to deviate from free trade is stronger.
Thus, even though the set of possible deviations from free trade under the
No FTA game is a strict subset of those under the FTA game, it does not
follow that free trade is more likely to be a stable equilibrium of the No FTA
game.
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we show that trade liberalization
of any kind is desirable under symmetry so that free trade yields higher world
welfare than any other policy regime (Lemma 1). We then derive Nash
equilibria of the two games (Proposition 1 and 2). Next, we show that when
countries are symmetric, free trade is the unique stable equilibrium of the
No FTA game (Proposition 3) whereas the FTA game also admits a bilateral
FTA as a stable equilibrium (Proposition 4). Next, we show that free trade
fails to be a stable equilibrium of the FTA game if one of the countries is
su¢ ciently high cost relative to the other two (Proposition 5). Continuing
with the same underlying asymmetry, we then provide conditions under
which free trade is a stable equilibrium of the FTA game (Proposition 7)
but not that of the No FTA game (Corollaries 1 and 2). Propositions 8 and 9
describe conditions under which di¤erent patterns of FTAs emerge as stable
equilibria. Finally, for the case of linear demand, we graphically illustrate
stable equilibria of the two games; isolate the building and stumbling bloc
e¤ects of FTAs; and examine how the FTA option a¤ects the welfare of
individual countries and the world as a whole (Proposition 10).
4 Equilibrium FTAs under symmetry
Through-out this section, we assume that the cost of producing good x is
equal across countries: i =  for all i. It proves convenient to begin with
the e¤ects of FTAs on global welfare.
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4.1 Trade liberalization and welfare
We show in the appendix that a reduction in any countrys tari¤(s) (whether
on a preferential or a non-discriminatory basis) increases aggregate world
welfare. This implies the following:
Lemma 1: Under symmetry, free trade yields higher world welfare than
any other trade policy regime: ww(F ) > ww(ij; ik) > ww(ij) > ww().
The intuition behind this result is simple: when all countries have the
same cost of production, the allocation of output across countries is immate-
rial and any trade restrictions (whether preferential or multilateral) simply
lower aggregate world output and therefore welfare. Since any tari¤ creates
a deadweight loss, rent extraction by an importing country is more than
o¤set by the loss in prots of exporters.
4.2 Nash equilibria
Before deriving (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria of the two games, we clar-
ify an expositional point: while changes in the underlying trade regime result
from announcement deviations by countries, it proves more convenient to re-
fer directly to regime changes rather than changes in announcements. For
example, when the bilateral FTA hfijgi is in place, the unilateral announce-
ment deviation of country i from fj; g to f; g alters the underlying trade
regime from hfijgi to no agreement hfgi and we refer to this announcement
deviation of country i as simply a deviation from hfijgi to hfgi.
It is clear that no agreement hfgi is a Nash equilibrium of the No FTA
game since no country has a unilateral incentive to announce another coun-
trys name if the latter does not announce its name in return. Furthermore,
symmetry implies that under no agreement hfgi, welfare of all countries
is equal. Clearly, the same is true under free trade hfFgi. Since world
welfare is higher under hfFgi than under hfgi (Lemma 1), it follows that
each country is better o¤ under hfFgi than under hfgi. As a result, under
symmetry no country has a unilateral incentive to deviate from free trade
since any other announcement on its part leads to no agreement where it
15
(and everyone else) is worse o¤:
wi() < wi(F ) for all i (13)
Proposition 1: Under symmetry, no agreement hfgi and free trade
hfFgi are both Nash equilibria of the No FTA game.
The following two conditions prove useful in describing the Nash equi-
libria of the FTA game:
Condition 1:
wk(ij; ik) < wk(ij) (14)
i.e. if condition 1 holds, each country prefers to be a non-member under a
bilateral FTA to being a spoke under a pair of bilateral FTAs.
Condition 1 can be understood as follows. The tari¤ reduction that
country k receives from country i under hfij; ikgi removes the disadvantage
it faces relative to country j while exporting to country is market under
hfijgi. However, to achieve equal footing with country j in country is
market, country k has to grant preferential access to country i in its hitherto
fully protected market. Thus, country ks preference among regimes hfijgi
and hfij; ikgi is ambiguous in general.
Condition 2:
wi(F ) < wi(ij) (15)
i.e. if condition 2 holds, each country is better o¤ as a member of a bilateral
FTA relative to free trade i.e. two countries nd it benecial to exclude
the third.
It is clear that no agreement hfgi is always a Nash equilibrium of the
FTA game. Is a bilateral FTA hfijgi a Nash equilibrium too? Comparing
country ks welfare under hfijgi and hfgi, we note that export prots of
country k are higher under hfgi relative to hfijgi (i.e. ki(t; t) > ki(t; 0)
and kj(t; t) > kj(t; 0)) whereas its domestic surplus under the two regimes
is the same (i.e. sk(ij) = sk() = Sk(t; t)). Therefore, we have the following
result:
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Lemma 2: A bilateral FTA between countries i and j makes country k
worse o¤ relative to no agreement:
wk(ij) < wk() (16)
Since world welfare is higher under hfijgi relative to hfgi, the above
inequality implies that the sum of countries i and js welfare must surely be
higher under hfijgi:
wi(ij) + wj(ij) > wi() + wj() (17)
Since countries i and j are symmetric, we must have
wi(ij) = wj(ij) > wi() = wj() (18)
Hence, a member country of a bilateral FTA has no incentive to deviate to
no agreement and a bilateral FTA hfijgi is indeed a Nash equilibrium of the
FTA game.
Is a hub and spoke arrangement such as hfij; ikgi a Nash equilibrium?
Before addressing this question we note that
wi(ij; ik) > wi(F ) (19)
The logic behind this inequality is as follows. Starting at free trade, if coun-
try k revokes its FTA with country j, export prots of country i increase
in both markets because its rival exporters face tari¤s whereas it itself does
not: ij(0; t) > ij(0; 0) and ik(0; t) > ik(0; 0). Furthermore, the domes-
tic surplus of country i does not change relative to free trade since its own
tari¤ equals zero under both regimes: si(ij; ik) = si(F ) = Si(0; 0). As a
result, country is welfare under hfij; ikgi is higher than that under hfFgi.
Furthermore, we assert that wj(ij; ik) < wj(ij): the move from hfijgi
to hfij; ikgi makes country j worse o¤ since it loses its preferential status in
country is market. Next, note from Lemma 1 that ww(ij; ik) > ww(ij). As
a result, either country i or country k or both of them are better o¤ under
hfij; ikgi relative to hfijgi. Given the fact that the hub countrys welfare
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under hfij; ikgi exceeds even that under free trade (see 19), we make the
following assumption:
Assumption 3: The hub country of a pair of independent FTAs enjoys
higher welfare than a member country of a single FTA:
wi(ij; ik) > wi(ij) = wi(ik) (20)
We are now ready to investigate whether hfij; ikgi is a Nash equilibrium.
Three possible unilateral deviations from hfij; ikgi need to be considered:
 UP1: Country is deviation from hfij; ikgi to hfgi.
 UP2: Country is deviation from hfij; ikgi to hfijgi (or hfikgi).
 UP3: Country ks deviation from hfij; ikgi to hfijgi.
Deviation UP1 can be ruled out because wi(ij; ik) > wi() whereas
deviation UP2 can be ruled out on the basis of Assumption 3. Finally, note
that deviation UP3 cannot occur if condition 1 fails: wk(ij; ik) > wk(ij). As
a result, a pair of bilateral FTAs hfij; ikgi is a Nash equilibrium if condition
1 fails.
Is free trade also a Nash equilibrium of the FTA game? To be able to
answer this question in the a¢ rmative, we need to rule out the following
two deviations:
 UF1: Country ks deviation from hfFgi to hfijgi.
 UF2: Country ks deviation from hfFgi to hfij; ikgi (or hfij; jkgi).
Inequalities (13) and (16) imply that deviation UF1 cannot occur:
wk(F ) > wk() > wk(ij) (21)
Furthermore, deviation UF2 can be ruled out due to the following result:
Lemma 3: Under the pair of independent bilateral FTAs hfij; ikgi, each
spoke country (i.e. j and k) is worse o¤ relative to free trade.
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The logic behind this result is as follows. Since world welfare is lower
under hfij; ikgi relative to free trade hfFgi whereas the welfare of the hub
country is higher (see inequality 19), the sum of the welfare of the two spoke
countries (i.e. j and k) must be lower than that under free trade. Since
both are symmetric, it follows that both must be worse o¤ under hfij; ikgi
relative to free trade hfFgi:
wj(ij; ik) = wk(ij; ik) < wj(F ) = wk(F ) (22)
The following proposition summarizes the Nash equilibria of the FTA
game:
Proposition 2: No agreement hfgi, a bilateral FTA hfijgi, and free
trade hfFgi are all Nash equilibria of the FTA game. In addition, if condi-
tion 1 fails then a pair of bilateral FTAs hfij; ikgi is also a Nash equilibrium.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that both games admit multiple Nash equi-
libria. To resolve this multiplicity (as well as to capture the process of FTA
formation in a richer fashion), we now focus attention on Nash equilibria
that are immune to self-enforcing coalitional deviations (i.e. are coalition
proof or stable).
4.3 Stable Nash equilibria
We begin with the No FTA game. Recall from Proposition 1 that the No
FTA game admits two Nash equilibria: hfgi and hfFgi. Which, if any, of
these is stable? It is easy to see that all three countries have a joint incentive
to deviate from hfgi to hfFgi each is better o¤ under free trade than
under no agreement. Based on the denition of a stable Nash equilibrium,
hfgi fails to be stable if the initial deviation from hfgi to hfFgi is self-
enforcing i.e. no country or a pair of countries has an incentive to further
deviate from hfFgi. This indeed is the case because any such deviation
(unilateral or coalitional) reverts the world back to status quo under which
everyone is worse o¤. As a result, we have the following:
Proposition 3: Free trade is the unique stable equilibrium of the No
FTA game.
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This result implies that when countries are symmetric, FTAs cannot
possibly act as building blocs. We now turn to the FTA game and examine
which Nash equilibria are stable.
We begin with no agreement hfgi. Consider a member countrys wel-
fare under the FTA hfijgi relative to no agreement hfgi. It is immediate
from (18) that countries i and j always have an incentive to jointly deviate
from hfgi to a bilateral FTA hfijgi. Furthermore, since hfijgi is a Nash
equilibrium of the FTA game (Proposition 2), there can be no unilateral
deviations from it. As a result, the initial joint deviation of countries i and
j from hfgi to a bilateral FTA hfijgi is self-enforcing and no agreement
hfgi is not stable.
Now consider a hub and spoke arrangement such as hfij; ikgi as a can-
didate for a stable Nash equilibrium. We know from inequality (22) that
countries j and k always benet from a joint deviation from hfij; ikgi to
global free trade hfFgi. Once again, this joint deviation is self-enforcing
since hfFgi is a Nash equilibrium. As a result, a pair of bilateral FTAs
hfij; ikgi is also not stable.
Two candidates for stable equilibria remain: free trade hfFgi and a
bilateral FTA hfijgi. Consider free trade rst. For free trade to be stable,
we need to rule out three types of coalitional deviations by a pair of countries:
 JF1: Deviation of i and j from hfFgi to hfgi.
 JF2: Deviation of j and k from hfFgi to hfij; ikgi.
 JF3: Deviation of i and j from hfFgi to hfijgi.
Since wi(F ) > wi()(inequality 13) the joint deviation JF1 cannot occur.
Similarly, since wj(ij; ik) < wj(F ) (inequality 22), we can rule out deviation
JF2. Can deviation JF3 be ruled out? Clearly, if country i is worse o¤ under
a bilateral FTA relative to free trade (i.e. condition 2 fails) then deviation
JF3 cannot occur. Under such a scenario, free trade hfFgi is immune to all
coalitional (as well as unilateral) deviations and is in fact the unique stable
equilibrium of the FTA game.
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But what if countries i and j have an incentive to jointly deviate from
free trade hfFgi to a bilateral FTA hfijgi (i.e. condition 2 holds)? To
determine whether this deviation is self-enforcing or not, we need to consider
two further deviations from hfijgi:
 FD1: Deviation of country i from hfijgi to hfgi.
 FD2: Deviation of country i from hfijgi to hfij; ikgi.
It is immediate from Lemma 1 and inequality (18) (i.e. wi(ij) > wi())
that deviation FD1 cannot occur. What about deviation FD2? From as-
sumption 3 (see inequality 20) we know that, taking country ks announce-
ment as given, country i has an incentive to further deviate from hfijgi to
the pair of bilateral FTAs hfij; ikgi i.e. deviation FD2 will indeed occur.
As a result, the initial joint deviation of countries i and j from free trade
to the bilateral FTA hfijgi (i.e. deviation JF3) is not self-enforcing. Thus,
free trade hfFgi is stable even when condition 2 holds.
Can hfijgi also be stable when condition 2 holds? It turns out that the
answer to this question depends on whether condition 1 holds or not. First
consider the case where condition 1 fails i.e. countries i and k have a joint
incentive to deviate from hfijgi to hfij; ikgi. We know from Proposition
2 that hfij; ikgi is a Nash equilibrium when condition 1 fails. Therefore,
when condition 1 fails the initial deviation of countries i and k from hfijgi
to hfij; ikgi is self-enforcing. As a result, if condition 2 holds and condition
1 fails, bilateral FTA hfijgi is not stable.
Now consider the case where condition 1 holds. First, since condition 2
holds, there exists no incentive for all countries to multilaterally deviate from
hfijgi to free trade hfFgi. Second, since condition 1 holds, countries i and
k have no joint incentive to deviate from hfijgi to hfij; ikgi. Finally, since
condition 2 holds, inequality (22) implies that country i has no incentive to
jointly deviate with countries j and k from hfijgi to hfij; jkgi (or hfik; jkgi).
As a result, a bilateral FTA hfijgi is stable if both condition 1 and condition
2 hold. We summarize as follows:
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Proposition 4: Free Trade hfFgi is a stable Nash equilibrium of the
FTA game and it is uniquely stable if either condition 1 or condition 2 fail.
A bilateral FTA hfijgi is a stable Nash if both condition 1 and condition 2
hold. Finally, no agreement hfgi and a pair of bilateral FTAs hfij; ikgi
are not stable Nash equilibria.
The above proposition claries that under symmetry FTAs end up acting
as weak stumbling blocs: while free trade is uniquely stable under the No
FTA game, there exist conditions under which a bilateral FTA is also stable
under the FTA game. Yet, this is not a particularly strong indictment of
FTAs while free trade loses its uniqueness, it still continues to be a stable
equilibrium.
Given these results, it is natural to ask whether a di¤erent role for FTAs
might emerge when countries are not necessarily symmetric (say with re-
spect to their costs of production of good x). For example, is it possible
that in the absence of symmetry, two countries are willing to enter into a
bilateral FTA but unwilling to engage in multilateral free trade? Even more
interestingly, can the option to form bilateral FTAs facilitate the obtainment
of multilateral free trade? We now turn to these questions.
5 FTAs among asymmetric countries
From hereon, we drop the assumption that the production cost of good x is
equal across countries. It proves instructive to focus on the case where two
countries have symmetric and low costs relative to the third. Accordingly,
throughout the analysis under asymmetry, let a = b = 0 and c =  > 0.
Note also that Lemma 1 requires a slight modication: trade liberalization
necessarily improves world welfare under asymmetry as long as it is not
biased against low cost producers. In other words we know the following:13
ww(F ) > ww(ab; ac) > ww(ab) > maxfww(); ww(ac)g (23)
13Note that ww(ab; ac) = ww(ab; bc) and ww(ac) = ww(bc).
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Intuitively, a bilateral FTA between a low cost and a high cost country has
two conicting e¤ects on world welfare. On the one hand, it increases world
welfare by raising the aggregate output of good x. On the other hand, it
diverts production away from a low cost source to a high cost one and this
adverse allocation e¤ect harms world welfare. The proof of Lemma 1 can
be modied to show that as long as the asymmetry between countries is not
too high, an FTA between a high and low cost country also increases world
welfare (since the allocation distortion is mild in such circumstances).
We begin with the No FTA game and rst show that under cost asym-
metry global free trade may fail to obtain even when countries are not free
to form bilateral FTAs.
5.1 Feasibility of free trade
Consider the perspective of the two low cost countries (denoted by i = a; b).
From proposition 1 we know that under symmetry, the welfare of country
a low cost under free trade hfFgi is higher than that under no agreement
hfgi:
lim
 !0
wi(F   ) > 0 for i = a; b (24)
Assumption 2 implies:
@wi(F   )
@
> 0 for i = a; b (25)
i.e. the higher the cost of country k, the larger the gains of multilateral
trade liberalization for the low cost countries.
Inequalities (24) and (25) together imply that the two low cost coun-
tries have no incentive (joint or unilateral) to deviate from free trade to no
agreement:
wi(F ) > wi() for i = a; b (26)
Next, consider the high cost countrys (i.e. cs) perspective. Dene P to
be the prohibitive cost level at which the export prots of country c under
free trade equal zero in each foreign market:
lim
 !P
ca(F ) = lim
 !P
cb(F ) = 0 (27)
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Since domestic surplus of each country is higher under no agreement hfgi
than under free trade hfFgi the following is immediate:
lim
 !P
wc(  F ) > 0 since sc() > sc(F ) (28)
Inequalities (24), (28), and assumption 2 imply that there exists a critical
threshold cost level () such that:
wc()  wc(F ) i¤    (29)
Intuitively, opening up its market is unattractive to the high cost country
when it stands to gain very little (or nothing) from foreign trade liberaliza-
tion. Thus, the following obtains under asymmetry:
Proposition 5: Free trade is the unique stable equilibrium of the No
FTA game i¤  < .14 Or else, no agreement obtains.
Thus, global free trade fails to be a stable equilibrium even when coun-
tries lack the option to form bilateral FTAs as long as one of them is su¢ -
ciently high cost relative to the others (i.e.  > ). Recall from Proposition
3 that under symmetry free trade is uniquely stable under the No FTA game
and when such is the case, FTAs can only act as stumbling blocs. Is this
also true when countries are asymmetric? We now show that this is not so.
5.2 FTAs as strong building blocs
In this sub-section we show that the option to form bilateral FTAs can
serve as strong building blocs there exists circumstances where free trade
is stable under the FTA game whereas it is not so under the No FTA game.
Intuitively, this result obtains since the high cost country prefers no agree-
ment to free trade which in turn it prefers to a bilateral FTA between the
other two countries: wc() > wc(F ) > wc(ab). The key point is that under
a purely multilateral approach, the high cost country can ensure the preser-
vation of the status quo by voting against free trade whereas it cannot do
14When  = , both no agreement and free trade are stable. An analogous statement
applies to the remainder of the propositions under asymmetry.
24
so when bilateral FTAs are permitted. As a result, in the FTA game it can
end up calling in favor of free trade to avoid ending up as a non-member
with the other two countries in a FTA. Before showing this, we state the
following result (proved in the appendix):
Proposition 6: There exist no unilateral or self-enforcing joint devia-
tions involving the two low cost countries from free trade.
Given this result, it is clear that the viability of free trade depends criti-
cally upon the preferences of the high cost country. Following the denition
of  (in 29) let r dene the critical threshold cost level below which the
high cost country prefers free trade to regime r:
wc(F )  wc(r) i¤   r (30)
where r = fhfgi; hfabgi; hfacgi; hfbcgi; hfab; acgi; or hfab; bcgig. Arguments
analogous to those that underlie the existence of  ensure that these critical
cost thresholds also exist for the other trade policy regimes.15
We know from (16) that the high cost country always prefers no agree-
ment to being a non-member: wc() > wc(ab). This is because its export
prots are always higher under no agreement hfgi relative to the bilateral
FTA hfabgi while its domestic surplus under the two regimes is the same.
As a result, we must have wc(   F ) > wc(ab   F ) which implies that
the critical cost threshold () at which wc( F ) = 0 is smaller than the
one (ab) where wc(ab  F ) = 0:
Lemma 4:  < ab.
Similarly, by denition, the high cost country has an incentive to uni-
laterally deviate from free trade hfFgi to hfab; acgi i¤  > ab;ac.16 Before
proceeding further, it is convenient to write down a condition analogous to
condition 1:
15Note that the threshold ac (similarly bc) exists only when wc(ac) < wc(F ) under
symmetry. Otherwise, it is immediate from A2 that wc(ac) > wc(F ) for all .
16The same critical cost obtains for the unilateral deviation to hfab; bcgi. In fact, since
the two low cost countries are symmetric, their roles can be reversed without loss of
generality.
25
Condition 1A:
wc(ab; ac) < wc(ab)
Note that condition 1A is equivalent to ab < ab;ac and if it holds then
the hub and poke arrangement hfab; acgi cannot be an equilibrium since
country c prefers being a non-member to being a spoke. We can now state:
Proposition 7: Suppose condition 1A holds. If   ab then free trade
is a stable equilibrium of the FTA game; otherwise the bilateral FTA hfabgi
is stable.
Proposition 5 and 7 together imply the following:
Corollary 1: If condition 1A holds, FTAs act as strong building blocs
whenever  <  < ab.
The above result hinges on the insight that when free trade is not feasible
due to the reluctance of the high cost country, the fact that the low cost
countries can form a bilateral FTA can make it a willing participant in global
free trade since it is worse o¤ as a non-member country than it is under free
trade. It is worth noting here that Baldwin (1995) argued that the expansion
of a regional trade bloc can induce outsiders to join since their export prots
su¤er if they stay outside. In our model, a similar logic operates but there are
several important di¤erences. First, our logic does not rely on the presence
of economies of scale. Second, the formation of FTAs is fully endogenous in
our approach. Third, and more importantly, our model highlights the fact
that under a purely multilateral approach, a country that is reluctant to
liberalize can e¤ectively prevent liberalization between its trading partners
and the removal of such veto powercan sometimes be necessary to achieve
global free trade.
When  > ab free trade is not feasible under either game. However, the
second statement of Proposition 7 implies that there is still a sense in which
the freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs proves benecial. More specically,
the option to form FTAs can lead to welfare-improving trade liberalization
that is ruled out by the No FTA game: when  > ab, the FTA game yields
hfabgi whereas the No FTA game yields hfgi. Under such circumstances,
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we say that FTAs act as partial building blocs the option to pursue bi-
lateral FTAs delivers partial trade liberalization whereas the multilateral
approach delivers none. The policy implication here is that insisting only
on multilateral trade liberalization can sometimes run the risk of ending up
with no trade liberalization.
What happens when condition 1A fails? If so, country c prefers hfab; acgi
to hfabgi and the equilibrium outcome depends on how it ranks hfab; acgi
and hfgi:
Proposition 8: Suppose condition 1A fails. If   ab;ac then free
trade is a stable equilibrium of the FTA game; otherwise, the hub and spoke
arrangement hfab; acgi is stable.
As is clear, Propositions 7 and 8 are quite similar: the rst argues that
either free trade or a bilateral FTA between the two low cost countries is
stable whereas the second states that either free trade or a hub and spoke
arrangement with a low cost country as a hub is stable. Propositions 5 and
8 imply the following:
Corollary 2: If condition 1A fails, FTAs act as strong building blocs
when  <  < ab;ac and they act as partial building blocs when ab;ac < .
However, we should note that when condition 1A fails, FTAs are not
always a force for the good. In particular, when ab;ac <  <  FTAs act
as weak stumbling blocs because the hub and spoke arrangement hfab; acgi
is stable under the FTA game while free trade is stable under the No FTA
game. On other hand, even when condition 1A fails, so long as the high cost
country prefers hfab; acgi to hfgi, there is another sense in which FTAs
act as partial building blocs the FTA game delivers hfab; acgi whereas the
No FTA game yields hfgi.
We next provide a graphical illustration of our main results under asym-
metry using linear demand.
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6 A linear demand illustration
Suppose u(xi) = xi   x
2
i
2 + y so that pi(xi) = 1   xi. To ensure that the
high cost rm has positive sales in all markets under all trade regimes, we
need  <  = 13   t: this boundary denes the feasible parameter space in
all gures.
We now illustrate stable agreements under the two games of trade liber-
alization. As is clear from Figure 1, free trade is stable under the No FTA
game i¤    = 1+t11 .
 Insert Figure 1 here 
The region over which free trade is stable under the No FTA game is
determined by the high cost countrys unilateral incentive to deviate from
free trade to no agreement. By contrast, under the FTA game, this region
is determined by the high cost countrys incentive to deviate from free trade
to the bilateral FTA hfabgi under which it becomes the excluded country.
Figure 2 illustrates the stable agreements under the FTA game. As is clear
from Figure 2, free trade is stable under the FTA game i¤   ab = 3 4t17 .
Multiple stable equilibria arise over the darker region: both hfabgi and hfFgi
are stable.
 Insert Figure 2 here 
To understand why multiple stable equilibria arise in the darker region,
consider possible deviations from free trade in this region. The only devia-
tion from free trade that can potentially occur here is the joint deviation of
countries a and c to hfacgi and we can show that:
wa(ac)  wa(F ) i¤   ac = 11t  2
10
(31)
However, this deviation is not self-enforcing since taking country bs an-
nouncement as given, country a has an incentive to further deviate from
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hfacgi to hfab; acgi:
wa(ab; ac)  wa(ac) = t(6 + 15t  2)
32
> 0 for all  (32)
Now consider possible deviations from hfabgi. First, all countries have an
incentive to jointly deviate from hfabgi to hfFgi. However, as indicated
above, this deviation is not self-enforcing when   ac since countries a
and c have an incentive to further deviate from hfFgi to hfacgi. Second,
the joint deviation of countries a and c from hfabgi to hfab; acgi is self-
enforcing and it determines the left hand-side border of the darker region:
wc(ab; ac)  wc(ab)  0 i¤   ab ab;ac = 6  19t
34
(33)
Figure 1 and Figure 2 together imply that free trade is stable when pro-
duction technologies are relatively similar across countries. Furthermore, as
Figure 2 shows that when country c is su¢ ciently high cost FTAs act as
partial building blocs: multilateral free trade is infeasible and no agreement
hfgi obtains under the No FTA game whereas the bilateral FTA hfabgi
emerges under the FTA game. When there exist multiple stable equilibria,
there are two distinct scenarios to be considered. In scenario I, we assume
that over the darker region in Figure 2, free trade is stable whereas in sce-
nario II the bilateral FTA hfabgi is stable. We consider each in turn.
 Insert Figure 3 here 
Under scenario I, Figure 3 shows that free trade is stable over a much
larger region under the FTA game. Since the high cost country prefers
hfgi to hfabgi, its incentive to unilaterally deviate from free trade is greater
under the No FTA game relative to the FTA game. As a result, FTAs act as
strong building blocs when  <  < ab. It is worth emphasizing that this
result obtains when the cost disadvantage of country c is of an intermediate
magnitude. If country c is too high cost, it loses too little in export markets
from the preferential trade liberalization that occurs between countries a
and b and for domestic surplus considerations it prefers to retain its own
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tari¤s. Similarly, when its cost is quite low it prefers to form FTAs with
both its trading partners.
Now consider scenario II where hfabgi rather than hfFgi obtains as the
stable agreement over the darker region of Figure 2. A comparison of the
two trade liberalization games under scenario II is presented in Figure 4.
 Insert Figure 4 here 
Under scenario II, we highlight three di¤erent regions in Figure 4. In
region A, hfFgi is a stable agreement of the No FTA game whereas hfabgi
obtains under the FTA game. As a result, in region A, FTAs act as stumbling
blocs for multilateral trade liberalization. However, even under scenario II,
FTAs continue to act as building blocs: in region B of Figure 4, they act as
strong building blocs whereas in region C they act as partial building blocs
(since the bilateral FTA hfabgi obtains under the FTA game whereas no
agreement hfgi obtains under the No FTA game). How does the option to
pursue FTAs a¤ect the welfare of individual countries and that of the world
as a whole?
Proposition 9: Under linear demand, the following obtains: (i) when
FTAs act as building blocs (strong or partial), the option to form bilateral
FTAs benets low cost countries (as well as the world as a whole) whereas
it hurts the high cost country and (ii) when FTAs act as stumbling blocs, all
countries lose from being able to form bilateral FTAs.
Why does the high cost country lose when FTAs act as building blocs?
To see why, rst note that, for all t > 0, the high cost country always prefers
no agreement to the bilateral FTA hfabgi. Thus when FTAs act as partial
building blocs, they necessarily make the high cost country worse o¤. Recall
that FTAs act as strong building blocs only when wc() > wc(F ) > wc(ab).
So here too the high cost country loses from the option to form FTAs.
Finally, note that when FTAs act as stumbling blocs (as in scenario II),
all countries are willing to jointly deviate from hfabgi to hfFgi. However,
due to the incentives of countries a and c to further deviate from hfFgi to
hfacgi, the bilateral FTA hfabgi obtains as a stable equilibrium.
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7 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the long-standing debate regarding the relation-
ship between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization by analyzing
two trade policy games: one where countries can choose between both types
of trade liberalization and another where they can only pursue the multi-
lateral route. An important aspect of the paper is that it explicitly models
the process of FTA formation and allows each country to form more than a
single FTA. Furthermore, to capture FTA formation in a realistic fashion,
we focus on Nash equilibria that are immune to self-enforcing coalitional
deviations.
At a general level, our analysis sharpens the stumbling versus building
bloc debate regarding FTAs by highlighting conditions under which each
of the two e¤ects is likely to obtain. More specically, when countries are
relatively symmetric, the option to pursue FTAs hinders the obtainment
of global free trade in the sense that free trade is no longer uniquely stable
when FTAs are permitted. On the other hand, free trade is harder to sustain
under asymmetry and FTAs can actually be desirable from a world welfare
perspective. In fact, we show that there indeed exist circumstances where
global free trade obtains as an equilibrium only if countries are free to
form bilateral FTAs. We also nd that FTAs can deliver welfare improving
trade liberalization when multilateral free trade is infeasible  i.e. it may
indeed be better to have some trade liberalization (even though it occurs on
a preferential basis) as opposed to none. Another interesting result of the
paper is that a hub and spoke type trading regime is not a stable equilibrium
under symmetry. Finally, it is worth noting that FTAs never act as strong
stumbling blocs in our model i.e. it is never the case that the FTA game
yields no agreement whereas the No FTA games yields free trade.
To allow for greater richness in the modeling of FTA formation, we have
kept the underlying model of intraindustry trade as simple as possible. It
is important to determine whether our approach to FTA formation can be
fruitfully applied to general equilibrium models of inter and intraindustry
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trade (such as the Ricardian model of comparative advantage and the mo-
nopolistic competition model of trade in di¤erentiated goods). We leave this
for future research.
8 Appendix
Trade liberalization increases welfare
Di¤erentiating world welfare with respect to t gives:
dWW
dt
=
dSi
dt
+
X
z 6=i
dzi
dt
(34)
Using u0 = pi and xi = xii +
X
z 6=i
xzi, we have
dSi
dt
=

1  dpi
dt

[xi   xii] + [pi   ] dxii
dt
+ t

dxji
dt
+
dxki
dt

(35)
Also note thatX
z 6=i
dzi
dt
=

dpi
dt
  1

[xi   xii] + [pi      t]

dxji
dt
+
dxki
dt

(36)
where we have made use of the rst order conditions for prot maximization
for each rm. From equations (34) through (36) we have:
dWW
dt
= [pi   ] dxii
dt
+ [pi   ]
X
z 6=i
dxzi
dt
(37)
Using xi = xii +
X
z 6=i
xzi, the following is immediate:
dWW
dt
= [pi   ] dxi
dt
< 0 since
dxi
dt
< 0 (38)
i.e. lowering tari¤ improves world welfare. Analogous arguments establish
that (i) the lowering of its tari¤ on an MFN basis must also improve world
welfare and that (ii) it is socially optimal to set an FTAs external tari¤ to
zero.
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When countries are asymmetric, trade liberalization increases welfare so
long as it increases the aggregate output of good x. Only when liberalization
is biased in favor of a high cost country can it be the case that dxidt > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
First consider country as unilateral deviation from hfFgi to hfbcgi. The
following is immediate from (21):
lim
 !0
[wa(bc)  wa(F )] < 0 (39)
From assumption 2 we know
@ [wa(bc)  wa(F )]
@
< 0 (40)
Inequalities (39) and (40) together imply that
wa(bc) < wa(F ) for all  (41)
Since a = b = 0, starting at free trade, neither country a nor b has an
incentive to unilaterally break any of its FTAs. Recall from (26) that low
cost countries have no incentives to unilaterally or jointly deviate from hfFgi
to hfgi.
We now rule out deviations of country a from hfFgi to hfab; bcgi. It is
immediate from (22) that
lim
 !0
[wa(ab; bc)  wa(F )] < 0 (42)
From assumption 2 we have
@ [wa(ab; bc)  wa(F )]
@
< 0 (43)
Inequalities (42) and (43) together imply that
wa(ab; bc) < wa(F ) for all  (44)
As a result, a low cost country has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from
hfFgi to hfab; bcgi. This also implies that countries a and c have no incentive
to jointly deviate from free trade hfFgi to hfab; bcgi.
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Next, consider country as deviation from free trade hfFgi to hfac; bcgi.
We know from (23) that ww(F ) > ww(ac; bc). Also, wc(F ) < wc(ac; bc).
This implies that countries a and b must both be worse o¤ under hfac; bcgi
relative to hfFgi
wa(ac; bc) = wb(ac; bc) < wa(F ) (45)
Therefore, there exist no unilateral or joint deviations from hfFgi to hfac; bcgi.
Thus, all feasible coalitional deviations have been ruled out except for
the following:
 (JD1): joint deviation of countries a and b from hfFgi to hfabgi.
 (JD2): joint deviation of countries a and c from hfFgi to hfacgi.
From assumption 3 we know that, even if these two deviations were to
occur, taking countries b and cs announcements as xed, country a has an
incentive to further deviate from from hfabgi in JD1 (or hfacgi in JD2) to
hfab; acgi. Therefore, neither JD1 nor JD2 is self-enforcing.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 6 states that countries a and b will not deviate from free
trade either unilaterally or jointly. To prove that free trade is stable if
  ab we only need to rule out unilateral deviations on the part of country
c. First note that if   ab then country c will not break both FTAs and
become a non-member. Second, it has no incentive to break one of its FTAs
and become a spoke under a hub and spoke arrangement (Lemma 3).
Now we show that hfabgi is stable when  > ab. Since
wa(ab) = wb(ab) > wa() = wb() (46)
countries a and b have no unilateral or coalitional incentive to deviate from
hfabgi to hfgi.
We now consider self-enforcing coalitional deviations from hfabgi. Since
condition 1 holds for all , country c has no incentive to jointly deviate
with country a (or b) from hfabgi to hfab; acgi (or hfab; bcgi). Next, note
that the joint deviation of all countries from hfabgi to hfac; bcgi is not self-
enforcing because countries a and b have a joint incentive to further deviate
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from hfac; bcgi to hfFgi. Furthermore, when  > ab country c has no
incentive to jointly deviate with country a and b from hfabgi to hfFgi.
Finally, suppose that countries a and c have an incentive to jointly deviate
from hfabgi to hfacgi. It is immediate from assumption 3 that country a
wants to further deviate from hfacgi to hfab; acgi. As a result, the initial
deviation from hfabgi to hfacgi is not self-enforcing and hfabgi is stable.
Proof of Proposition 8
The rst statement of Proposition 8 is immediate from Proposition 6
and the denition of ab;ac. Consider the second part. If ab;ac <  coun-
try c has no incentive to deviate jointly with country b from hfab; acgi to
hfFgi. Also, if condition 1A fails then country c has no incentive to deviate
(either unilaterally or jointly with a) from hfab; acgi to hfabgi. Moreover, a
simple extension of assumption 3 to asymmetry implies that country a has
no incentive to deviate from hfab; acgi to hfabgi or hfacgi:
wa(ab)  wa(ab; ac)  wa(ac)  wa(ab; ac) < 0 for all  (47)
Inequalities (47) and wa(ab) > wa() imply that country a has no incentive
to deviate from hfab; acgi to hfgi. Now consider the joint deviation of
countries b and c from hfab; acgi to hfgi. Note that even if this deviation
occurs, taking as announcement as given, b has an incentive to deviate
further from hfgi to hfabgi. As a result, the initial deviation is not self-
enforcing. The only remaining possible deviation is the joint deviation of
countries b and c from hfab; acgi to hfac; bcgi. However, this deviation is
not self enforcing since country b has an incentive to further deviate from
hfac; bcgi to hfFgi. As a result, if ab;ac <  the pair of bilateral FTAs
hfab; acgi is stable.
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